

himself recognized the teleological structure of reason can be demonstrated in several ways. The main object or end of reason in its practical use is an "end in itself" (*Zweck an sich*), namely human dignity. Even more clearly, the Dialectic of the second *Critique* shows that reason itself both desires and demands the realization of the highest and complete good, which consists in the synthesis of goodness and happiness.¹⁶ Reason itself is thus driven by a Desire that differs from the desire of happiness and all the drives and inclinations connected with it. The principle and criterion of morality is a Desirous reason or a reasonable Desire.

Eros or Desire, as presented in these pages, encompasses not only reason but also those particular and individual desires in which it can recognize or infiltrate its own orientation. If reason is taken to be a purely formal faculty, it functions as a "logical" criterion for the adventures through which Desire discovers what it wants. But this discovery primarily relies on the irreducible eroticism that precedes all use of reason; it appeals to the recognition of that which is most authentic, "pure," and originary in our being moved and motivated by primary (or a priori) drives. Of course, this recognition presupposes and demands a wise discernment, and this must be acquired by experience and purification. Reason is involved in the genesis of discernment, but it would be blind if it were not supported by the trial and error of a Desire in search of its own secret.

Several topics for further investigation have thus emerged: the relations between reason and desire, authentic and inauthentic desires, logic and teleology, the growth of wisdom. These must be analyzed before we can sketch a critique of "pure" practical reason.

CHAPTER 9

Conscience

One of the dangers an ethics faces is its propensity for idealization. The course of a life is a mixture of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, pure and impure actions, institutions, rules, customs, attitudes, and structures. In attempting to sort out this mixture, we risk contrasting unrealistic pictures of pure virtue with their opposites while forgetting that human reality is most often transitional, unfolding somewhere between both extremes.

That we do not entirely fulfill the obligations we acknowledge is a sad but trivial fact. What is more significant is that the very truth of our obligations, the criteria that rule them, and the dispositions that make us good are not given once and for all, but must be conquered through the transformation and purification of the dispositions with which we begin the struggle. What we initially take to be a decent disposition, basic to the moral quality of our life, is forever shifting; our conscience itself is involved in a course of growth and change. But how can we know whether we are making progress at this most basic level of morality? How is the amelioration of a conscience possible?

Experience and Self-Critique

All experience experiences something other: even if I experience a pain or a hidden wish or a thought still immersed in feeling, my subjectivity is outgoing, transcendent. At the same time, however, I am aware of my

experiencing that something: I have an experience of my experience. Experiencing my experiences, engaging in the preconceptual reflexivity of my involvement in the universe, conditions the possibility of profound change. If I completely coincided with my experiences, without being able to “have” them in an at least minimal kind of nonidentity, I could not change anything of their mode or character. Because I do experience them from a certain distance, however, they may develop into criticism and change.

The reflexive experience that accompanies each experience is not a mere observation; it is also an evaluation. In experiencing what and how I experience, a “metaexperience” evaluates the appropriateness of my experience of—and thus of my initial response to—the phenomena that appear to me. Although I may at times approve of my habitual responses, as given in my perceptions or treatments of the experienced beings, I sometimes or often feel uncomfortable with them. A suspicion emerges in me concerning my dealings with things or persons: is my way of perceiving or handling them correct? Am I biased, thereby distorting that which tries to tell me how it is? Such suspicions can initiate a growing discontent and disapproval. Behind or beneath the world with which I have become familiar, another manner of being touched and surprised, and along with it, another picture of the world, is budding.

Once I have discovered that my habitual mode of experiencing may be deficient, none of my experiences can be simply taken for granted. This discovery has led some modern thinkers to a generalized suspicion and doubt, even to skepticism. Perhaps their “all or nothing” attitude is not the wisest, but maintaining some distance and a certain level of caution are appropriate reactions to the loss of naïveté triggered by that discovery. From now on, all experiences are accompanied by a metaexperience that tests their adequacy.

This testing is not accompanied by a clear standard that I could formulate and apply to ongoing experience, however. The standard, which must somehow guide the evaluation, is not simply given. It remains hidden, although it is already operative, as my suspicion or unrest shows; it inhabits the testing, but it must make itself explicit before I can distinctly experience how it rules me.

Each experience is a kind of experiment with regard to an appearance: can I see or feel it this way, or does it resist such an approach? Is my way of perceiving refuted by the thing itself? Can it give itself as it is if I

persist in this mode of reception? Each experience is thus accompanied by a wider perspective whose rule is the following: give any phenomenon the best chance to express itself! This rule cautions our spontaneous observations: Did you see it accurately? Look again!

Desire for the truth imposes this rule. Appropriate correspondence, accurate adjustment of my openness to the phenomena is what Desire wants. Inauthenticity and distortion spoil the desiderata. Desire carries with it the confidence that it is oriented toward the pure and genuine being of all that appears attractive, but we also know that many desires make us biased. The struggle to deliver the appearances from distortion by purifying and authenticating one’s own outgoing drives encompasses the entirety of erotic life, from the most basic and elementary dimension of experience to the highest level of illuminated speculation. Correspondence is therefore not merely a matter of propositions and rational proofs; it demands an adjustment of the entire person, including moods, senses, feelings, tastes, and corporeal postures. *Askēsis* has become the name for the exercises in purification that are required to move from crude modes of being to authentic and well-attuned modes. In order to correspond well, we must learn to conquer our inauthenticity by freeing the moments of truth in our relations to the universe. Loyalty to the phenomena presupposes a certain purity of life; one must become more true to the being of things by loving or hating, admiring or despising, welcoming or fighting them more appropriately.

Aquinas uses the mysterious word *convenientia* to indicate the originary affinity between the human mind and the being of all things. Desire is rooted in a love (*amor*) that is “pleased with” (*complacens*) all beings insofar as they truly are, and thus are good. Desire directs human lives toward various kinds of union because of the essential “convenience” of the various kinds of being with the soul.¹ This basic friendship and familiarity is not recognized, however, unless the soul is purified from narcissistic indifference.

The Voice of Conscience

Self-purification is guided by conscience, but conscience itself must become more perspicacious and pure. How can an impure conscience discover and acquire greater purity? Two factors are required: (1) a voice that challenges the average conscience by pointing to a more genuine mode of

conscience, and (2) exemplary persons whose impressive appearance sheds light on the impurity of average consciences. The voice can be an inner voice or the outer voice of another's pastoral, therapeutic, or prophetic word. Or rather, both voices work together: without the challenging voice of others, my inner voice will probably remain asleep, and even a prophet cannot have an effect on my conscience if this does not recognize the agreement of his words with its own appeal.

Moral heroes and saints can be perceived as voices that speak to me while I am still discovering the authentic core of my own conscience. I can hear the tone of another's behavior as proof of that person's genuine goodness through which I can gain access to a conscience more genuine than my own. The converting voice must come from a prophetic voice that resonates in the heart of my conscience.

The voice of an average conscience is a flat translation of the original voice by which all consciences are most profoundly inspired. The moral struggle is in the first place a struggle for coincidence with that inspiration; conscience itself should become as pure as it is originally meant to be. Conscientious self-critique is therefore the basic task of a serious life.

Conscience and Culture

Since one's conscience is formed by the particular culture in which one is educated, the self-critique of a conscience is ipso facto a critique of the cultural elements integrated in it.

By living in a certain epoch and participating in a subculture of a general culture, we share in a particular ethos. We are farmers, salespersons, intellectuals, academics, journalists, cooks, gardeners, and so on in this country and in this time. Each profession has its own customs and institutions; adherence to one of them may make a difference for our moral conceptions, but the general ethos of a country seems to have more bearing on the formation of individual consciences. Insofar as I have assimilated the general ethos, my conscience agrees with the average participant, "everyman." "Everybody" is convinced that human rights and democracy must be promoted, that adults must be free to arrange their own lives, that devotion to justice is good, and so on. Some "general" convictions, however, are contested by minorities, who propagate another ethos in the name of new ideals or the mores of other times or countries. For all people, however, a critical judgment about their own conscience presupposes that it has

already been formed. At least parts of the prevailing ethos are already incorporated, not only in our convictions, but also in our reflexes. Moreover, each conscience has already developed a personal style: it can be rigorous or lenient, narrow or wide, accurate or sloppy.

Once we discover that our conscience, as it has developed, cannot simply be taken for granted, the critical task begins: we must test our conscience and the cultural elements it has integrated. The self-critique of one conscience thus implies the critique of the culture in which it is steeped. Cultural criticism begins with the experiential self-evaluation described above. We critically experience our experiential reproduction of the "normal" emotions, habits, beliefs, and demands. Moral growth implies a distance from the normative ethos that we share with the communal (sub)cultures and traditions to which we adhere.

Often we can criticize the prevailing rules and opinions of a society by pointing out that they harbor contradictions (compare, for example, Marx's critique of capitalism or Nietzsche's critique of moralism). It is more difficult to overcome an ethos that is coherent yet founded on false intuitions or experiences that are widely proclaimed valid and normal. One must then develop a sense for more genuine experiences that contradict the prevailing belief. The most difficult task lies in the search for a more original genuine conscience, as this is a rarity hardly recognized by "everybody." Conscientious self-critique demands conversion from the prevailing corruptions of a particular culture to the rare purity of authenticity.

Ethos and Conscience

There is no other rock on which an ethics can build than conscience, but the average self-consciousness and self-interpretation of conscience is quicksand rather than granite. Insofar as a conscience has already been formed by education and growth, there is no guarantee that its formation was not simultaneously a (partial) deformation. Moreover, the conscience that issues from today's inculturation is a confusing and sometimes contradictory multitude of guidelines. And here we must correct the suggestion implied by our references to "the ethos of our culture" and "the average conscience." Indeed, we are confronted with many ethoses, and it is not possible to live in the world without concocting some mixture of elements from different moral traditions. Confronted with a variety of cultures and subcultures that differ, conflict, or overlap in the postmodern

world, we must adopt a position with regard to very diverse traditions and theories about good and evil, all of which imply a determinate conception of conscience. How should my conscience react to conceptions that are different?

The ethos with which I have become familiar is a particular synthesis of the various ethoses of my country, the family into which I was born, the Church to which I belong, the workplace where I meet with colleagues, and the ideological community in which I feel at home. However, there are still other ethoses I can share, for example, the ethos of the wealthy, that of the (upper or lower) middle class, or that of the poor; the ethos of academics, intellectuals, or the media; Catholic, Protestant, liberal, humanist, stoic, hedonist, utilitarian ethoses, and so on. Within every ethos there are also different levels (for example, the level of the ideal and that of the practical) and modes (for example, an average, mediocre, exemplary, or decent but not excellent mode).

Refined studies in the sociology of culture and social psychology are required to map all the varieties and combinations that form the "ethical multiverse" in which we participate. A philosophy of conscience must answer the question of what this multitude of factual consciences means for a true and authentic conscience.

The existence of a specific ethos and of the conscience implied in it does not guarantee that they are good. How shall we respond to the plurality of factual consciences and the multitude of ethoses to which they can appeal?

Philosophers are wont to consult with the classics of their own discipline in order to create clarity and prepare a solution for their most difficult questions. In ethics they preferably turn to Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Ricoeur, and Levinas. (Whether the widespread neglect of Epicurus, Plotinus, Saint Augustine, Spinoza, Fichte, Schopenhauer, and Marcel is justified, will not be decided here.) It is obvious that each classical ethics confronts us with a particular ethos that is (at least somewhat) different from ours, although affinities and partial continuities cannot be denied. Familiarity with the classics and sensitivity to the climate of their world are needed to characterize the conscience that speaks to us from their texts. The Platonic and Aristotelian *kalokagathia* fits well in a Greek celebration of the divine cosmos, but it is much more aesthetic than the Stoic *ataraxia* or Kant's rigorous view of rational obedience. Thomas' natural subordination of sensibility to reason and of reason to

God's law reflects a more peaceful conscience than the romantic longing for unreachable bliss, and so on. Each ethical philosophy is the conceptual instrumentation of a fundamental conscience that seeks a clearer understanding of itself.

In addition to philosophical works, the entire range of dramas, poems, and novels presents us with specific types of morality, while evaluating them explicitly or implicitly. The diversity of factual consciences and ethoses, as presented in literary, philosophical, psychological, pedagogical, theological, and other interpretations, confronts a philosopher with at least two important questions: (1) How must we interpret this manifold of interpretations in order to determine a morally and ethically justified response (attitude, action, or plan)? (2) How can the search for authentic conscience succeed, once it is confronted with its own dissemination into such a manifold?

Several responses to the first question are possible. Because at least some of the existing ethoses (and the consciences unfolded therein) contradict one another, attachment to some of them necessarily excludes others. On the basis of this insight, one can adhere to one (simple or composite) ethos and condemn the incompatible ones. This can be done thoughtfully or dogmatically, in a reactionary or progressive manner. Although the reactionary way is inclined to appeal to the past ("the tradition," "the ancestors," "the origin"), the progressive mode appeals to the future ("history" as progress and providence).

A second answer was given when—especially in the eighteenth century—the plurality of moral cultures was interpreted as a series of variations on a common theme: human nature. Some universal convictions and moral norms were singled out, which seemed to represent the essential (nonposited or "positive" but "natural," that is, universally human) stock of all consciences.

The belief in a common essence or nature is no longer popular among intellectuals. But how do we interpret the similarity between the various ethoses? One popular position claims that not only all persons but also all convictions and consciences ought to be respected. But how can one respect those that flagrantly contradict one's own? In fact, those who defend this position exclude all positions that disagree with their own imperative of universal respect for any ethos or conscience. Many of them would deny that the many ethoses are separated by real contradictions. In their interpretation, the variety of consciences entails only differences. The

apparent or seeming contradictions veil a deeper similarity or contrariness that makes the conflicting positions incommensurable rather than mutually destructive. According to these interpreters, the opposition between consciences is more or less analogous to the differences between Dante and Milton or between Velazquez and Rembrandt.

Perhaps the empirical scattering of consciences can indeed be interpreted as the effect of an underlying unity. If all the expressions of conscience are only attempts at capturing an ideal, their differences and obvious exclusions can be understood as deficient expressions of a common search or quest. All of them would then point to the idea of a most pure and true conscience (that is, the most true and pure knowledge of good and bad that can be attained), which at the same time motivates us and makes it extremely difficult to capture it adequately.

The presence of an ideal conscience in all its interpretations can be compared to the light that illuminates the originary Desire that forcefully moves us, although our wish of possessing it in the clarity of conceptual language cannot be fulfilled. Our many attempts at elaboration show how that light—through the prism of our urge for insight—is broken in partial and biased exposures. If this metaphorical description of true conscience and its inseparability from Desire is valid, we must penetrate the surface of its more or less shadowy translations into a variety of ethos. The question remains, however, whether and how we can find another access than the conceptual one to the “knowledge of good and evil” that enlightens the heart.

In any case, it is impossible and immoral to adopt the position that all convictions deserve the same degree of respect. If that were true, anything goes; there would be no reason to search for adequacy of conscience and arbitrariness would triumph. Against this form of immoralism we must maintain that factual consciences, ethos, and ethical theories can be incarnations of evil, as Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* and Sade’s fantasies demonstrate.

Education in a corrupt culture is not easy to overcome. At the very least, it demands a conversion. But the problem has a more general dimension: since we are drawn by conflicting inclinations, we must *learn* how to evaluate their ends and the combinations suggested by them; we must learn how to distinguish between good and evil, even after we have already been accustomed to a certain kind of conscience. Despite its actual concretization, conscience pushes us forward to a revision along the path

of self-critique and purification. The basic task of moral self-consciousness precedes all obedience to norms and application; it demands that we detect and overcome all corrupt elements that have spoiled our conscience. *Katharsis* is the ancient device that names this task—a task almost forgotten in modern and postmodern ethics.

Before we consider the difficulties involved in moral purification, however, we must answer the question of how we are able to discern what is authentic and pure in the existing kinds of ethos and conscience?

Recognition

If Desire is seeking what it desires and conscience longs for an insight into its own most genuine “knowledge,” they are on the way to the ideal of fully self-conscious and enlightened perfection. If correspondence is the law, this perfection consists in an ongoing life that is well attuned to all good and bad “things,” constellations, situations, and events with which the individual in question is confronted.

To translate these generalities into a more concrete portrait of moral excellence is a task so difficult that no individual could achieve it on his own. For millennia the authority of mythological, religious, philosophical, or ideological traditions have aided in this task. Adherents of Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, or Philosophy knew about good and evil because they learned from their religious, Platonic, Stoic, or hedonistic communities.

Since the beginning of modernity, autonomy has replaced authority: I, this singular individual, must accept full responsibility for my thinking and acting. No other, individual or collective, consciousness or conscience can take away my fundamental sovereignty. There is an element of truth in this thesis—the acceptance of authority cannot do without personal recognition—but if we really were completely and singularly responsible for the justification of all our thoughts and rules, we would fail miserably. A symptom of such failure may be seen in the widespread agnosticism and skepticism that is the result of the modern experiment in autonomously demonstrated truth. Fortunately, however, people, including all philosophers, have continued to rely on the authority of communities and traditions for the moral, aesthetic, literary, and philosophical trends and manners that rule their lives. Only the bearers of authority and their quality have changed: instead of the biblical traditions, for example, Descartes and

Hume or Nietzsche and Heidegger, and some more ephemeral stars have acquired extraordinary power in the philosophical world, whereas other circles are more impressed by novelists, journalists, pop singers, or other celebrities. There is an enormous inflation of authority in the "democratic" adulation of all sorts of heroes, but the idea that everybody has or should have a personal opinion has not died. Even in philosophy one often hears a disparaging tone when a reviewer remarks that an author "only" explains what Plato or Kierkegaard thought without forwarding his or her own criticisms. However, it is rare that someone who does criticize the classics professes thoughts that are neither popular or traditional, nor borrowed from other classics. Important criticism is the flip side of positive insights that can be unfolded into impressive thoughts, but fault-finding without any attempt to renew traditional questions and answers is seldom productive.

Personal freedom and responsibility imply that, whatever interpretation or norm is proposed or imposed, an individual must at least be able to recognize it as reasonable, (probably) correct, and good. We would not be capable of justifying our thoughts and practices if we could not begin by relying on opinions and codes that are offered by classics and traditions; but we cannot freely adhere to opinions or codes unless we recognize them as (partial or approximative) expressions of what we "somehow," "somewhere," "deep down," always already have "known" and sympathized with as being "on target" or "right."

Although all of us are committed to the customs of a characteristic way of life, the freedom of this way presupposes that we recognize the rules of our behavior as justified. Recognition or *anamnēsis* is a necessary condition for a free conscience and personal virtue. External voices and words may be required to wake us up, but if they do not conspire with an already present, albeit sleeping or dreaming, conscience, they cannot make us free.

Recognition of truth or goodness in a proposed theory or code would not be possible if we were not guided, inhabited, obsessed, or possessed by a preperceptive, prepropositional, precognitive, and preexperiential sense for goodness and truth. A pure—albeit embryonic—conscience wants to become concrete in all our desires, ideas, criticisms, attempts at reformation, and conversions. A full unfolding of this conscience would give us a picture of ideal virtue: a person who most perfectly responds to the phenomenal "multiverse" by heeding its splendors and fighting or correcting its horrors. All finite phenomena would be respected and abhorred accord-

ing to their own nature and proportions, whereas the infinite desideratum in light of which they are perceived would be honored as such.

From the above it follows that the texts and traditions to which we appeal for help in our search for an authentic and authorial conscience cannot have the last word. Hermeneutics, as the ensemble of repeated and retrieved interpretations of moral experiences, is a necessary but insufficient condition for a successful search, because the decisive phase lies in the recognition through which those who are involved in this search identify a proposed interpretation as a more or less accurate expression of the most authentic but deeply hidden conscience. If we take this conscience to be identical with the source and core of all authentic experiences in the dimension of morality, we can state that the significance of all hermeneutics primarily depends on the authenticity of the experiences to which the various interpretations refer and so, indirectly, on the quality of the conscience implied in them.

The experiences of one who is fortunate enough to have a lucid and accurate conscience are morally appropriate; if she is a sensitive and skillful interpreter, she can write an excellent ethics. But how does one become good in experience, perception, sensitivity, genuineness, conscience? This question has often been neglected in modern philosophy. A widespread misunderstanding of autonomy, together with the relativistic "democratization" of perceptivity and evaluation, has fostered the belief that all individuals are equally able to establish how the most difficult phenomena must be perceived and appreciated. Experience itself has been delivered over to common sense, which Descartes and his followers—perhaps incorrectly—considered generally shared by most people. But, like all human activities—and especially the basic ones—experiencing implies difficult tasks and can be achieved in many ways. Superficiality, sloppiness, lack of concern, anxiety, arrogance, indifference, and many other obstacles can hide or distort the look or sound or touch or worth of the phenomena. Not everyone is a specialist in aesthetic or moral or religious experience. Anyone who is not blind can see that this plant is not a stone, but as soon as we begin talking about its details, its relationship to the surroundings, its significance for human beings, and so on, the experiences of those interviewed begin to differ. In science, much energy is spent on establishing norms and methods for accurate observation. No scientist would tolerate being corrected by the common sense of unskilled observers; why, then, should the accuracy of moral experiences be left to just anyone?

Many think that moral experiences, together with aesthetic and religious experiences, are too “subjective” to serve as the basis for any universally valid theory. Some even deny the possibility of distinguishing correct from faulty experiences in these domains. Insofar as an ethical theory is an interpretation of moral experiences, it only expresses a subjective perspective, which then might resonate with other individuals who share that perspective. The relativism that accompanies this position can take two forms: either it sees the various perspectives as complimentary—and perhaps partly spoiled—perspectives that point to a complete and unspoiled truth, which may or may not be discovered as such; or it considers all perspectives equally subjectivistic and unreliable. In the latter case, it implies that experience as such should be distrusted and that the attempt to describe authentic experiences is futile. We should then not be concerned about experiential purity and progress in the art of experiencing.

If anything goes, not only empiricism but all phenomenology is condemned. If ethical theory is still possible at all, it should be limited to the logical investigation of formal structures while leaving all other questions to the subjectivistic sense that is common to all individuals.

The exclusion of moral sensitivity from the realm of universally valid observation is one cause for the disappearance of an indispensable insight that dominated the history of philosophy from Parmenides and Plato until the end of the Middle Ages. If one experience differs in quality from another experience, if one person is better in experiencing than another, if one can learn to experience in a more accurate way, if one’s way of experiencing can undergo radical conversions, then an experiential propedeutic is a necessary condition for any phenomenology and for philosophy in general.

Katharsis

No sympathy for rationalism or idealism can annul the necessity of a certain empiricism in philosophy. We must at least recognize that the search for knowledge and evaluation must begin with empirical data, which then should be conceptualized through analysis, reflection, synthesis, and so on. Not all data are equally apt to function as the basis for theoretical elaborations; experiences differ in quality. Modern philosophers have distinguished the experience of “primary” and “secondary” properties and focused their attention on the influence of the observer’s subjective

conditions on the appearance of observable objects. At least implicitly, they recognize that some experiences are more reliable and better points of departure than others, but rarely do they acknowledge that experiencing is a difficult task that demands education and refinement. The philosophical treatment of experience often gives the impression not only that everyone’s experience is good enough to build a theory upon, but also that experiences do not change. However, both suppositions are false. Like all other tasks, experiencing involves trial and error, experimentation, advancement or regression, growth in openness and perspicacity; it demands orientation, reorientation, critical revision, ongoing practice, and theoretical reflection. All these elements must be dealt with in a theoretical as well as a practical propedeutic.

Such a propedeutic would constitute an ethics of experience. But should this (part of) ethics then precede the rest of ethics? If so, where would the propedeutic find its own experiential support? Does it presuppose its own results or even those of the entire ethics? Are we turning in circles? Perhaps. But the fear of being in the midst of a circle should not deter us from exploring the a priori conditions of what we are doing; for circularity characterizes the most important realities, such as freedom, responsibility, existence, being, and God.

A propedeutic of human experience has many branches. One of them concerns the cultural characteristics and historical transformations of collective types of experience (for example, in everyday life, science, art, religion, and morality). This branch would involve a theory of hermeneutics, insofar as various types of experience (1) are decisive for the interpretations that have emerged from them, and (2) imply embryonic interpretations. In this chapter, however, I want to focus on the propedeutic practice of individuals who have become aware of the need to replace their half-blind or distorted experience with a more genuine and truthful one. As it was said before, even on the level of perception and originary evaluation, we must “do justice” to all things, but how can our actual way of experiencing become “just”? The transition from corrupted modes of experiencing to better ones is part of the purification that was a basic element of most philosophies from Empedocles to the late Middle Ages.²

In an epoch where the idea of formation of the entire person, humanistic education, role models, and discipleship are replaced with the selling of information and the quickest possible technical training, a plea for katharsis must seem odd: are we not all equipped with the same capac-